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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case was brought by plaintiffs to recover damages
based on failure of the defendant

B;'>.;~K

OF EPHRAIM to enforce cer-

tain obligations against a co-maker of a note and for damages
arising out of various acts of intentional interference with business relations and slander.

Defendants BARTON counterclaimed

on various grounds, including obligations claimed due from one
of the plaintiffs.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
After trial before The Hon. Peter F. Leary, Judge in
the Third Judicial District, sitting with a jury, seven of plaintiffs' ten causes of action were dismissed by the court and three
causes of action were submitted to the jury, resulting in verdicts
for defendants and against plaintiffs.

As to the counterclaims of

defendants BARTON, the jury gave judgment against plaintiff CHARLES
R. KENNEDY on three causes of action, found for plaintiffs and
against counterclaimants on two causes of action and the court
dismissed the Sixth Cause of Action of counterclaimant GEORGE
BARTON and all of the counterclaims of BERTHA BARTON.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants respectfully request that the court reverse
Portions of the judgment on which the trial judge ruled as a matter

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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of law and dire'c::t en<::c

of =-:::;r:tent in favor of plilintiffs with

respect to enforcement of
BARTON.

also

Plain~iffs

was contrary to the

and defendant
sonal and

CE.~.RLES

G~ORGE

busi~ess

~ev1sion

~.

~or

"jo2_~_-:

as a:

organize~

many years.

Their business

venture" along 1-1ith several other
·, inc0rrJora tecl c;roup, looseLy reter rec

to as a partnership.
This group,

'\E:-:J:;EDY (hereinafter "KENNEDY")

-erelnafter "Kl..'<TON") were close per-

assc::ciate~

b~siness

of one jury verdict which

the instruc::tions.

~~d

3~PTON

associations ir:::ludeo =.
persons doing

see~

ev~dence

Plai~_':iff

obligations of defendant GEORGE

t~~

oise known as the Barton Syndicate.
-· 1967, owned certain mining claims

~r~o:c

in the Oquirrh :·iountcn:_s of 2'0:',t Lake Valley (R. 65)).
will observe
of both the

t~at

for

Re~orter's

documents by the page
the record for appeal,

consis~C'~cy,
Transc:;~2_pt

appellants refer to the pages
and the clerk's collection of

<ssiqnecl by 'che clerk in preparing

:!umbe~

notw~-:~standing

was originally -ossig:1c":: in
In the fall of

~

(The court

·-=

19~-

that a different page number

trar.script by the reuorter)
KE'l:iLDY desire(! additional funds fo'

other business purposes and c:: _ :-.sul ted with B:\RTON concerning obtaining a loan :'rom d0':c:nda:_the "BA.c\K") .
Director of

;"'=
t~lE'

.HE B.'\'iK

OF J:Pil''i\Hl ('•ereinafter

tha': -:.:..;c',e s: _ 2.t all times since, BARTON y;as a
BANK as ··.el

~

a s~bstuJ1tial stoc:-:holder (R. 89]).
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BARTON wrote a letter of recommendation to the BANK in
connection with KENNEDY's application for a $40,000.00 loan (R. 682
and Exh. 16-P).

Thereafter and on or about November 27, 1967, the

8.1\NK granted to KENNEDY the loan of $40,000.00 1-1i th the stipulation
in the BANK's own documents that GEORGE BARTON would be a co-signer
(Exhs. 34-P and 26-d).

At the time the loan was made to KENNEDY

and co-signed by BARTON, KENNEDY paid BARTON the sum of $499.98
as a "commission" or a "finder's fee" pursuant to check dated November 23, 1967 (Exh. 18-P), which was subsequently endorsed by BARTON
(R. 793) and paid by KENNEDY's bank on December 5, 1967 (Exh. 19-P).
This fee represented part of the consideration for the co-maker's
signature of BARTON, along with other transactions which continued
to be engaged in between KENNEDY and BARTON.
At or about the time the loan was made, BARTON agreed
to pledge a Certificate of Deposit owned by him as collateral for
the loan (R. 684).

That pledge was made within 60 to 90 days follow-

ing granting of the loan and was designed to satisfy the bank
examiners with respect to collateral on the loan (R. 786 and 899)
From time to time, the loan was renewed in varying amounts, but the
savings certificate continued to be pledged for the loan (Exh. 34-P
and R. 785).

One of the renewal notes is shown as Exh. 21-P and

the savings certificate is shown as Exh. 17-P.
The loan subsequently became delinquent, but the KENNEDYS
~ere

unable to pay the amount when due.

The BANK thereafter

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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brought suit against CHARLES R. and REBECCA Z. KENNEDY in Sanpete
County, Utah.

Although GEORGE BARTON was also named as a defenda:r:
1

in the Complaint, he was never served and rro action was taken agai:,:
him in connection with that matter.
judgment was entered

~gainst

On or about July 19, 1973,

defendants KENNEDY in that action

in a hearing which was held without the presence of the KENNEDYS,
who had requested a continuance by reason of illness.

The matter

was, therefore, treated essentially as a default matter. (Se" the
entire file in the prior action, Exh. 58-d).
Subsequently, the business and personal associations
between KENNEDY and BARTON deteriorated into less friendly relationships.

Disagreements arose concerning sale of claims owned oy

the Barton Syndicate, concerning transfers of various interests
in the syndicate and also concerning efforts at collection of the
judgment held by the BANK against the KENNEDYS.

No effort was mad2

to collect against GEORGE BARTON on the note.
'l'he KENNEDYs brought suit alleging various damages agair,:
all parties in ten causes of action.

After trial in this matter,

the court d1smisscd seven of the causes of action as a matter of
law plus portions of the other causes and submitted certain
of three causes of action for lUry dotermination.

porti~

Appellants herf

claim that the court's orders were erroneous as they affected the
obligations of GEORGE

BARTO~

on THE

H~NK

or· EPHRAIM note and the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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savings certificate held as collateral.

In addition, the jury

verdicts,as hereinafter detailed, were erroneous in certain respects by reason of improper instructions from the court.
ARGUMENT
I.

DEFENDANT THE BANK OF EPHRAI!:-1 SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO ENFORCE
THE OBLIGATIONS OF DEFENDANT GEORGE BARTON, INCLUDING OFFSET
OF THE PLEDGED SAVINGS CERTIFICATE.
A.

Having purposely failed to sue defendant GEORGE BARTON,
The Bank of Ephraim must be ordered to offset the pledged
Certificate of Deposit.
The most serious of the wrongs here disputed on appeal

relate to the knowing and intentional plan implemented by the BANK
and BARTON to relieve BARTON of any responsibility whatever, notwithstanding his clear legal obligations as co-signer on the note
and pledgor of collateral.
undisputed on this point.

The facts are clear and substantially
Exh. 21-P, which was the last renewal

note in the series before the note which was subsequently incorporated in a judgment, amply demonstrates the relationships of
ilie parties.

Although the KENNEDYS used the trade style "The Ken-

nedy Company Enterprises", the note was signed by CHARLES R. KENNEDY
and REBECCA Z. KENNEDY, his wife, as individuals.

On the reverse

of the note appears the clear language:
Ephraim, Utah

December 18, 1970

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, we hereby guarantee payment
of the within note, waiving demand of payment,
protest and notice of non-payment
/s/CHARLES R. KENNEDY
/s/REBECCA
Z.by the
KENNEDY
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding
for digitization provided
Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology
Act, administered
by the Utah State Library.
/s/GEORGE
BARTON
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Absolutely no question can exist reqarding the intent of GEORGE
B?~NK

BARTON and the corresponding intent of the

that BARTO'J would

be obligated to pay the note when due in the event 1t
otherwise paid.

w~s

not

BARTON received consideration which was legal

and enforceable (legal consideration not required to be in exact
equivalent amount) when he accepted, endorsed and cashed Exh. l8-D,
which evidenced lns intent to receive a co!1Ullission for help1nq
KENNEDYs to obtain the loan and co-signing the loan

(R

793).

BARTON acknowledged that he hoped to be paid for his services
in that connection (R. 967).

BARTON's obligation as co-signer

was part of the design from the very inception of the first loan
on November 27, 1967 (Exh. 26-d).

BARTON endorsed the savings

certificate as collateral to THE Bi'.NK OF EPHRAIM for the same
note which was executed by the KENNEDYs and co-signed by BARTON
(Exh. 17-P and R. 785).

Yet BARTON acknowledged, notwithstanding

his intent to pledge the CD and continue to

b~

obligated on the

note (R. 785 and 786), that he was never served with Summons in
the prior action by the BANK against KENNEDYs
Exh. 58-d) artd that no JUdgment

v/ClS

(as confirmed by

reHlerrcd agains'_ him (P. 789).

Yet BARTON was more than just a passive co-obligor, who was fortunately escaping his legal obligations.

By

design betweer1 the

BANK and BARTON, at the default heari;,c; ir, l 'J7 3, Bi\RTON
in court as a witness against the KEYNEDYs (R.

78R)

and all of

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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this after Bl\RTON had been so

happ~·

to recommend that the BANK

make the loan to the KENNEDYs (R. SOl and Exh. 16-P).
The BANK's own summary of the initial loan (Loan Program, Exh. 26-d) was completed in the handwriting of VIRGIL
JACOBSEN, former

BA~K

President (R. 771).

shows that GEORGE BARTON was
note at the inception.

Mr.

inte~ded
JACOBSE~

That document clearly

to be a co-signer on the
was deceased prior to the

time of trial, but portions of his deposition were read into
the record (R. 767-769).

Without reproducing all of the

rele-

vant testimony in detail in this Brief, we believe the testimony
of Mr. JACOBSEN can be summarized correctly as follows and confirms the position of KENNEDY against that of BARTON:
(a) BARTON put up the certificate at the time
the loan was made because he was a friend of Mr.
KENNEDY, and BARTON was willing to back the faith
in him by putting up the $50,000.00 collateral.
(b) Mr. KENNEDY ~as not asked to put up any
collateral at the tine.
(c) BARTON became co-endorser of the note as
well as the certificate.
(d) The BANK has never executed against the
collateral and has certainly not ever requested
that BARTO~ pay off the note.
(e) At the time the loan was made, Bl\RTON said
he would repay the loan, and that if he had to pay
it he would because he didn't have any choice.
(f) If /lr. KEN~EDY doesn't pay the bill, the
BANK would have no recourse but to go against the
collatcoral.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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(g) The c=c:::tifL:o:':ce v:as tenclc::::ed ~-- :Ji\RTON
·.-1ithin 60 to :J dci·:.s :1ft'2r the o~-:jiJ1:~2- lnan v.1us
made.

taken in the
co~~ext

o~

B~:K

the

doc_~ents,

clear~;

de~s~stra~~s

that at the
shoctly

~·n

~_:_?.TO::

OF :C:?HRAI:' that

~".2

s.---.aulc '-lave to pav

no:ce,

through the
It is

incredible to
the

defau~

re·:~e-.-~

t'.e recar::'. and concL.:::.eo

no~c

t on t".e

and

:z:::·:cmDY' -~

the.~

subsequent to

inab: :'i ty to pay the same,
)Jd~

exercisec

t~e

r_~'-)t

o~

~oreclasure

in t'le prior Sar.;:ete Cc.;nty cc.cc:ion,
tionally' ?ermitted a

that the court
ric;:-:~

no\

or offse:c aqainst the certifi-

I

I

eond has kn•>.·,·_:·yly and jnten-

le:;-al ob:..igor 7_a be r:oliccv'?C.: of obliyations:

s.:-.ould :::-2u,uire THE B..:...~~K OF

=?H~~I:1

to exercise i~

to offset -::'Je f·.- ::s re::>:cesent(·cl by t".e sa :inqs certi ficat2

agai..1st

the pas-r::-d

1E::

:.;::~~C1Zi":::_:JrJ

tl-:eccof.

B~?:O~

1

n3: be c

a:1 :.::tio:: upon _

t11

c·:-t:-;ch2r~·

the 3ANK

or

~~s

•rtial

kno~ingly

clischarc'
permitt~

ser:.~

liab~

_ _:_ t·i

f~'l'__::--l,lec~

__ ;_;O!l Cl:-

-Tl~·'"=:

-ertt

in vni ti:
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section 78-12-23 Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended, would be applicable.

That statute corrunenced run:-,ing no later than April 27,

1972, when the Sanpete County action was filed

(Exh.

58-d)

and,

thus, the statutory period expired in April, 1978, if not earlier.
~ook!

BARTON is left completely off the

A few comments are appro?riate regarding the equities
of the case.

The record reflects that the funds derived from the

initial loan at THE BAl\iK OF EPHRAI:.l were used by KENNEDY in other
investments.

KENNEDY acknowledged that the debt was due, subject

only to such counter-claims and of=sets as KENNEDY would have
against THE BANK OF EPHRAIM and/or BARTON.

The rhetorical ques-

tion is, "lvhy should BARTON be forced to pay any of that debt through
the certificate or otherwise?"

The most fundamental answer is that

he agreed to do so, and the BANK accepted the obligation in relis.

ance on the expectation that BARTO:! would pay or that the certi-

t.'

ficate would be used to pay.
from the unique relationship

The next fundamental answer arises
obvio~sly

inherent where BARTON is

_,

both a Director and a substantial stockholder of the BANK and is

rr'

in a position to influence the B.'\TZ management to pursue only

~

KENNEDY rather than pursuing him.

a.·

not be countenanced by this court.
h3d other business transactions,
:<uch open conccrrnnrJ the Barton
·ions clain•r•cl clr:e

.1s

Such improper influence should
Moreover, KENNEDY and BARTON

i~cluding
S~:;-c:1icate

one that is still very
claims, i;-1 r,,•hich obliga-

bc'c·.-:e>en B.-\ 10.':--\,:: and KENNEDY cou~d properly be

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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adjusted.

For the BANK to proceed without enforcing the just

obligation against BARTON or the col1ateral is both irocn':lral and
unlawful.
~hether

The record contains some disagreement as to

pl~dgc

it was intended at the 1nception of the loan and the

of

the certificate that BARTON's certificate would be the first sourc'
of funds upon default of the note in question.

rrhat issue

;/aS

~ourt

clearly resolved and does not have to be in order for this
to provide the relief sought by appellants.

\~hether

I1Ut

1

or not the

certificate was to be the first source of repayment without

pursu~

other action is now irrelevant.
ficate \vas to be used in the event of default, that Hr. B.".RTON

p~t'

up the certificate for that purpose (R. 767-769), the certificate
itself states that it is collateral to the loan

(Exh. 17-?) and

BARTON agreed in writing that he would guarantee the payment of
the note (Exh.

21-P).

Even though rt is not necessary for the court to detelmine whether or not an agreement existed regarding the certificate's becoming the first source ol

funds, we do bel-ie -e that

verbal testimony cited above in this Brief explaininq

~he

i

writtP~

instruments and the intent thereof provide amp1e, it not :nandato:
basis for this court to order thJ.t the B/\NK utilize> U""

ce~\ifica:

The law affecting this question can ue clearly appli0ro tCJ

\~1e

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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The general intent of the Utah legislature that written
agreements should be enforced according to their terms is expressed
in Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended, §70A-9-20l:
General validity of security agreement-Except as otherwise provided by this act, a
security agreement is effective according to its
terms between the ?arties, against purchasers
of the collateral and against creditors (Emphasis
added) .
Regarding agreements with respect to default, the
Code states:
[t]he parties may by agreement determine the
standards by which the fulfillment of these rights
and duties is to be measured if such standards
are not manifestly unreasonable.
Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended, §70A-9-50l(3)
Also, in the section dealing with the purpose of the
enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code, it is stated:
The effect of provisions of this act may be
varied by agreement, except as otherwise provided
in this act and except that the obligations of good
faith, diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed by this act may not be disclaimed by agreement but the parties may by agreement determine
the standards by which the performance of such
obligations is to be measured if such standards
are not manifestly unreasonable.
The presence in certain provisions of this
act of the words ''unless otherwise agreed" or
words of similar import does not imply that the
effect of other provisions may not be varied by
agreement under Subsection (3).
Utah Code

~nn.

1953, as amended, §70A-l-l02(3)-(4).
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The above authority firmly supports KENNEDY's contention
t:-,at the ur.dis'-'utcd 1-:rittcn agrel'rrtents arnonq the parLL(_'" recJarrling
collection on the note should be enfocced according to their terms,
including enforcement against BARTON.
If,

hov1ever,

the note ,_o-sic;ned by B11HTON is viewccl as

tr.e original contract and the agreements regarding the collateral
certificate are v1ewed as a subsequent modification of that
co~tract,

the collateral agreements are J1everthcless enforceable

according to their terms.
&

Loan_Association,

P.2d 39

same

See Birckart v. Greater Arizona Savings

101 Ariz.

l6f,

438 P.2d 40'1

(1968),

Pryo~2·

(1950).
In

~irckart,

ruling under Arizona Revised Statutes

§'4-519, Subparagraph 4, which is identical to §70A-3-604, Subparagraph 2,

Utah Code Annotated,

as to the effect of an C'ral

accc1 i

as amended 1965,

the court held

ar,,:) satl_sfac1 ion:

As between the original parties there is no difference between a note payable to X and one payable to the order X; tilL' di<ferc:>nce ilppear·s nnly
after the J te come~ ir 1 ~..J tnr' ~ands (>[ a hc~Ldf"L
in duo course, at lvhicJ, tlm,, 1 he lu.tt ccr nolc•, be i nq
negotiable·, CJlVes the ltulder a riqht of act1on free
of certain defenses agc:insl X, '.vhilc the former,
being nor,nec;otiable, docs not.
\'ie may,
stant case,

<:here fore, rcga!'u t.he note in lhc Lnas a simpl,_· contr"lct for Lhe paymc'nt
of mo:1ey, ar.d--evcn though i:. rna'/ he 1 n vn~ it- i nJ-it may be varied or di~chargcd by a new oral contrctct.
1·, I'Jilliston or: c:ontracts
(Fe\'. Ed.) ~;lR2iL
-~ec also 2 -P2st~z;~~~~:ili_t -of ~0:-~fG~ts, '1"~! 7.
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We hold, therefore, that under both contract
law and the N.I.L., an oral accord and satisfaction will discharge the simple contract for the payment of money.
404 P.2d at 405.
Numerous other cases support the rule that collateral
oral agreements of the parties may be introduced to explain the
written contracts.

For example, in an action to recover personal

property retained by a purchaser on real estate sold to him by
vendors, Harmon v. Waugh, 414 P.2d 119 (Colo. 1966), the Supreme
Court of Colorado held:
The court did not err in admitting the evidence
offered in order to determine the intent of the
parties.
There is a ~ealth of authority t~ support the proposition t'lat the "Parol Evi(-tetlCE
Rule" does not operate to exclude oral agreements
in explanation of a written instrument which patently
does not contain all the terms and conditions of
the contracting parties. See, 4 Williston on
Contracts, §630(3d Ed., l96IT; 3 Jones, Commentaries on Evidence, §1490, 1491 (2d Ed., 1929)
9 l'iigmore, Evidence, §2430 (3d Ed. 1940).
In Coulter v. Anderson, 144 Colo. 402, 357 P.2d,
we find the following pertinent language:
"l~hether a contract was intended by the parties
as an integrated one is, as indicated above, a
matter of intention.
See 3 Williston, Contracts
§633 and 3 Corbin, Contracts §581. \vhere i t i S
shown that a writing was not intended to be fully
integrated, terms other than those set forth in
the writing may be proved by parol evidence,
Fleming Construction Co. v. Scott, 141 Colo. 499,
348 P.2d 701.

4l4 P.2d at 121. Accord. Cromwell v. Gruber, 490
P.2d 1285 (\'lash App. 1912).
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The well-reasoned case of Sykes v. Everett,
585

(N.C.

1914)

83 S.E.

dealt vilth a fact si1·uation similar to the one 1n

the instant case.

There, the endorser of no':es cnc1orsC?d t.hom with

the oral agreement that in case of default, the endorsee would not
proceed aga1nst him unt

the collateral was exhausted.

The court

held not only that evidC?ncc of the oral agreement was admissible
to explain the sig11ature on the note, but also that the payee
was bound by this agrceme!lt.

The court explained:

[w]hen a payee or regular endorsee thereof writes
his name on the back of a note, as between him and
a bona fide holder for value and without notice,
the law 1mpJ LCS that he? intenrled to assume the \vellknown l1abil1t, of an endorser, and he will not be
permitted to contradict this implication; "but this
rule d0es not apply between the original parties
to a cor1rrac~ '.. 11ich is not in writing, although
there may be the signature of one or more parties
to authenticate that some contract was made.
ln
such cases it must always be a question of fact
what contract the signature authorizes to be written
above it; in other words, what was the agreement
of the parties at the time it was written.
There
.is no written contract to be altered; the whole
(except the signature, which by itself Jocs not make
a contract) exists in parol, and must be established
by such proof."
83 S.E.

al

'i 8 R .

The cases H~lied on by plaintiffs, holding thal
a creditor having collateral security for his note,
may, notwithstanding this fact, sue the debtor without first t·ec;ort ing to the cnl lateral a11d exhausti ncJ
it (Jones, Collateral Secur.it\· §686; Silvc·v v .
.1\xley, 11s N-:-~gsg-;--235.£. 933l, a.recfc;-tT:i r,ot
in point, becc;use here the endorser has not only
deposited the collateral, but required a further
aC)reement that his enc1orc>"P should not proceed
against him until it is e:<h,l\lc~ted.
8 3 S . E.

at '' 'Jrl .
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The foregoing authorities firmly establish that the
existence of the undisputed written agreement (Exhs. 17-P and
21-P) which provided that the certificate of deposit would be
a source of funds on default, as explained by the verbal testimony,
should be upheld.

The reasoning of the Sykes case, as applied

here, means that BARTON's certificate should be used to discharge
the note to the extent thereof, even if there were a separate
agreement that BARTON would not be personally liable for a deficiency.
B.

This court has the power to require entry of judgment in accordance with a correct application of
the law to the facts.
This court need not make new findings on any of the

issues concerning the point above discussed.

All of the facts

cited are undisputed, with the exception of the fact concerning
whether or not there was an oral agreement that the certificate
would be used first.
sary.

A determination of that point is not neces-

The court can properly construe that the bank had the

right to pursue KENNEDY in the prior Sanpete County action (Exh.
58-d) and, failing to collect from KENNEDY, to enforce the obligation against BARTON.

The simple fact is that the BANK has con-

tinued to harass KENNEDY without any effort whatever to collect
against BARTON or against the certificate.

Irrespective of what

the application of the law would have been in 1973, the facts
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as viewed under the law in 1978 should require that the BANK
take the certificate.
In several different ways in the Complaint, plaintiffs
requested that relief, i.e., Second Cause of Action (Paragraphs
21-23) of J\JnendecJ Complcunt,

(R.

lOS),

the Seventh Cause ot Ac-

tion (Paragraph 40, R. 112), the Eighth Cause of Action (Paragraph 43, R. 113) and the Tenth Cause of Action
R.

ll4), and all

saJ~d

]Paragraph 49,

causes of actiort were disnnssed as a mattc'r

of law by the court (R. 570, 1060 and 1061).

These dismissals,

as applied solely to the question of the offset
certificate aga1nst the note, were wrongful.

~f

the savings

Un ler §76

Utah

{C!)

Rules of Civil Procedure, the Supreme Court may reverse any order
or judgment and may d1rect the trial court to enter judgment as
corrected.

Appellants' request that the court require offset of

the certificate against the obligation for the reasons abovestated.
C.

The doctrine of res judicata does not bar the relief
sought by appellants.
In B1\RTON's Fc,urth DeLcnse \k.

J20'

and

'i'liL

R/\NK

OF EPHRAHl's Third Defense (R. 142), defendants' claim that the
doctrine of

re~

jud1cata will uar the relief souqht by appellants.

Specifically, by reason of the judgment obtained acJai nst >:ENNEDY
in the prior act1on (Exh.
no longer has

po~1er

58-d), it is asserted that the court

to require cnforccll1ent of the obl

iq.1•~ions
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against BARTON or the require use of the savings certificate in
partial discharge of the KENNEDY judgment.

The trial court's

dismissal of plaintiffs' Second, Seventh, Eighth and Tenth Causes
of Action or the portions thereof relating to the Certificate of
Deposit, may have been based on
at least in part.

~he

question of res judicata,

Appellants here submit that the doctrine of

res judicata does not apply.
Res judicata is a doctrine well recognized in the State
of Utah, but has limited application.
26 U.2d 113, 485 P.2d 1044

(1971)

In Richards v. Hodson,

the Utah Supreme Court stated:

Strictly speaking the term "res judicata' applies
to a judgment between the same parties who in a
prior action litigated the-rdentical questions
which are present in the later case .
The rule of law is wise in that it gives finality
to judgments and also conserves the time of courts,
to judgments and also conserves the time of courts,
in that courts should not be required to litigate
matters which have once been fully and finally
determined.
26 U.2d at 115 (Emphasis added). Accord. Belliston
v. Texaco, Inc., 521 P.2d 379 (Utah-r974); Wheadon
v. Pearson, 14 U.2d 45, 376 P.2d 914 (1962); East
Mill Creek \'later Compa:r; v. Salt Lake City, l~
U.315, 159 P.2d 863 (1945).
The related doctrine of collateral estoppel also requires
identity of issues and prior adjudication on the merits.

In Pen-

achio v. 1\lalker, 207 Kan. 54, 433 ?.2d 1119 (1971), the court ruled
that a prior action, brought by an insurance company without proper
right o::' subrogation and lvhich '::as dismissed on motion for summary
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judgment for that reason, will not act as a bar to a subsequent
action brought by the real parties in interest.

The court stated:

Although collateral estoppel is not as broad
in scope as the doctrine of res judicata, the necessary elements which make the two doctrines applicable
are much the same. Without reviewing all the necessary elements it will suffice for the purpose of this
opinion to state that there must be a judgment on
the merits \vhich determines -the rights and tl1e liabilities of the parties based on the ultimate facts
as disclosed by the pleadings or issues presented
for trial [citations omitted] and neither doctrine
operates to affect those who are neither parties nor
in privity therein [citiations omitted].
483 P. 2d at 1121 (Emphasis added) .
The broad justification for the application of the doc-

trines of res iudicata and collateral estoppel is that when a part,
has been heard on the merits on a particular issue, he should be
precluded from litigating that identical issue in a subsequent
action.

See Home Owners Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. NorthwesJ

Fire and Marine Insurance Co., 238 N.E.2d 55 (Hass. 1968); Gammel
v. Ernst

&

Ernst, 72 N.".2d 364

(!'linn. 1955).

We will briefly specify the reasons why the prior actioc,
including KENNEDY's countercla1w, did not bar the present claims
of KENNEDY on the certificate as above argued:
1.

KENNEDY's counterclaim in the prior action

was~

The counter·
claim of KENNEDY in the prior action contained allegations

cancer~

ing business damases from interference and slander, hut no

claim
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was there raised about the certificate.

In any event, there was no

adjudication on the merits as to that counterclaim in the prior action
and, therefore, res judicata or the more narrow collateral estoppel
should not bar the present action.

While there was a judgment for

the BANK on the note in the prior action, KENNEDY's counterclaim
was summarily dismissed without the taking of evidence or the hearing
of argument.
KENNEDY was deprived of the opportunity of a hearing on
the merits of his counterclaim in the prior action because he relied
upon representations made by Judge Harding that, should he submit
a motion for continuance and a supporting affidavit, a continuance
would be granted due to illness of his wife.

The proper motion

and affidavit were filed and the continuance was not granted, much
to the surprise of CHARLES R. KENNEDY's then counsel, Weston Bayles.
Having relied upon the continuance, no case was prepared to be
presented on the counterclaim and, therefore, the issues presented
in the counterclaim could not have been heard on the merits.
2.

The cause of action in the present action is not

the same as that in the prior action.

The prior action by THE BANK

OF EPHRAIM against KENNEDY and BARTON sought judgment on a note.
The present action is an action in tort; namely, for intentional
interference with business relationships and slander, with additional claims relating to the certificate.
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3.

The parties 1n the two actions are not identica

The prior action was brought by the nANK against KENNEDY and,noml!
BARTON; KENNEDY's counterclaim 1n tiJilt action 1-1as dircct.:·cl solel\
against the BANK.

The present action is against the BANK,

its

Directors and BARTON and his w1fe.
4.

The issues ra1sed in the present action were not

adjudicated in the prior action.

The issue before the court in

The Bank of Ephraim v. Kennedy (Exh.

S8-d) was liability on the

m1

Appellants contend that the judgment established only that the
note was in default and that KENNEDYS were liable on the note,
not how that liability was to be satisfied, and without un'f rcferfl
to BARTON or the certificate.

This theory is supported in that

various courts have described a Judgment for the recovery of monel
as a debt, evidence of a debt, or record of a debt.
Judgments §232
In
834

(\~.Va.

J

See 46 Am.Jur.l

(l%9i.
&

G Construction Co. v.

Freeport CC.!._~l_<::_Sl_~

1963), an action for execution on a

judgment,

129

s.r:.:

the suprc·

Court of Appeals of West Virginia described a judgment on prior iw
debtedness as "a new debt of rhe luq/,cst diqnity."
838

1/.'1 s

F.2d at

(Emphasis added).
The United States Supreme Court

Life Assurance Society v. Ford,

114 U.S.

j

n

f,JS

Pro'::_idc!J_t~vinSJS

(188'1)

dcscribr>d a

judgment for recovery of money as "a security of rec:nrrl :;ho,,·ing a
debt du<? from one person to anotlJet·."

l l 4

u.s.

il

t

64l .

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-21-

Appellants therefore assert that the judgment in The Bank

:a
1~

of Ephraim v. Kennedy represents a debt due on the note--that the
KENNEDYs, some of the defendants in that action, were liable on
the note.
Entirely different issues, the alleged contravention of

ot

written and oral agreements regarding collection on the note and
satisfaction throught the collateral, are involved in the present

n~l

action.

KENNEDY's liability on the note, at least in this situation

with the security agreements, does not necessarily determine the
obligations of the parties with respect to collection on the note
rf I

Jr. I

,_

as

against BARTON and the collateral.
Appellants respectfully submit that the requirements for

application of the doctrines of res judicata and/or collateral
estoppel are not present, and the trial court erred if it dismissed
appellants' causes of action relating to the certificate on the
grounds that they were barred by the prior judgment.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CERTAIN INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY.
A.

The trial court improperly refused to give plaintiffs'
proposed Instructions Nos. 2, 6, 16 and 17.
Most of the instructions complained of are intimately

tied in with the foregoing arguments relating to the Certificate
of Deposit.

jury.

The instructions are erroneous if they mislead the

This case presents a fairly unique situation by reason of

the way the court divided up the rulings of law as compared with
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lk~re

the issues submitted to Lhe jury.

specifically,

the: court

submitted to the iury plaintiffs' 1hird Cause of Action
suffered by r.,ason of
Montana),

(damages

lJ,tcrf,;encc ·,;lf:h business lru.nsilcl.ions in

plaintiffs' Fourth Cause of Action

the same subject matter)

(covering essentially

and parts of pi ai nt.i ffs'

Action (relatinq to i••U.crference b)
attempts to sell the Barton

defc~ndaJJt,;

UtCe

Synd~cate

Fifth l'ause of

claims).

If

with plai_ntiffs'
the IJANK had

previously applied the collateral savings certificate in the manne1
argued under Polnt I.

above,

Bi'I~K

the

would not have maintained a

judgment with which it could levy a writ of attachment on certain
Montana propert.
entitled to

k~ow

c

.~·:r

~h~·

b~
~~e

plinntiffs

(Exh.

'35-P).

l'he

iury v1as

BANK had nearly allowed the statute of

limitations to go by on the enforcement of the note against BARTO::
(plaintiffs' proposed Instruction No.2,

1<.

494),

vias enlitled to

know about the effect of oral modification of written a•rreements
(plaintiffs'

proposed

In~truct1on

No.(,,

H.

498)

c~nd

wets cr.titled

to know the effect of the language on the promissory note signed
by GEORGE BARTON to the effect that payment was guaranteed
tiffs'

proposed Instruction No.

17,

i',

')Of;,

similar manner, the actual Instructions Hos.
468-470)

and E>iL
25,

21-1').

:.!6 ancl 27

(plainInc
(R.

glvinq the impression that the ho1c1or of the r•ote could

sue either obl1::ror it chose,
the law of this case.

h'<'l-c'

l\s argued

rn~-.icadjnq
un.~·--r

Polnl

urtrle'r
.E.

the facLs am'

al;(lVC,

t11c
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as applied to the facts in the record should have required THE
BANK OF EPHRAI11 to take the Certificate of Deposit and to enforce
the obligations against BARTON along with enforcement against KENNEDY.

Since the jury was improperly instructed in the law on those

points, the jury was misled

when it considered the claims for

damages resulting from THE BANK OF EPHRAH1's harassment of KENNEDY
under the Third and Fourth Causes of Action.

Either the jury should

have been able to consider the correct law in balancing the factual
cteterminations it had to make or the court was erroneous in not
applying the

Certificate of Deposit and thus eliminating the

question of attachment on the judgment.
The relief sought by appellants under this point is either
a new trial on the issues submitted to the jury or, preferably,
the relief applying the Certificate of Deposit as argued under
Point I. above.
Appellants have also complained about the failure of the
court to give plaintiffs' proposed Instruction No. 16 (R. 507)
relating to the law of contribution.

This matter concerns the

judgment rendered by the verdict on BARTON's Fifth Cause of Action
under the counterclaim (R. 487 and 548).

That judgment arose out

of a note with The Barclay's Bank in California on which Barton
was a guarantor along with KENNEDY (Exh. 42-d).

BARTON paid the

balancP of that note and obtained judgment in this action for the
full amount paid by him.

It is the position of appellants that
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BARTON's remedy should have been only contribution for onc=-half
of the amount due rather than the entire amount.
The relevant law is:
h'here two or more co-obligors are jointly or jointly
and severally liable upon a contractual or quasicontractual obligation,and the rreditnr recovers
judgment thereon, an oLL1gor who is compo'llcd to
pay the whole or more than his share of such judgment may, as a general rule, recover contribution
from his co-debtors therefor.
18 Am.Jur.2d,

"Contribution" §58.

Where a party is entitled to contribution, the
general rule is that the measure of his recovery
should not be the entire amount paid upon the
principal obligat1on, but only the amount he has
paid in excess of his share.
18 Am.Jur.2d,

"Contribution" §15.

The Guaranty should as Exh.

42-d clearly evidencing that

KENNEDY and BARTON were ,ointly and severally l1able for The Barcli
Bank obligat1on.

Under the applicable law,

therefore, BARTON's

sole remedy should have been one-half of the amount he paid and
not the entire amount.

Accordingly, the court's refusal to give

plaintiffs' proposed Instruction No. 16
tribution was erroneous.
24

(R. 466)

(R.

In addition, the

507)
act~ual

relating to coninstruction No.

relating to The Barclay's note was similarly erroneous

because it set up the grounds for liability without specifying
the applicable law of contribution.
The relief sought by appellants under this point is
straightfo1ward,
i.e., the court should order the iudgmcnt on
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BARTON's Fifth Cause of Action of the counterclaim reduced to half
the present amount.
B.

Certain jury verdicts and judgments thereon are improper.
BARTON's Third Cause of MCtion on the counterclaim sought

$12,500.00 as a result of claimed proceeds from the sale of a 10%
interest in the Barton Syndicate.
matter is No. 21, R. 463.

The instruction concerning this

The basic evidence is that KENNEDY and

BARTON sold to a Jerome D. Kennedy of California a 20% interest
in the Barton Syndicate (10% from each of C. R. KENNEDY and BARTON)
for the sum of $25,000.00 (Exh.
was not remitted to him.

38-d).

BARTON's half of that money

In a separate transaction involving the

Barton Syndicate, KENNEDY purchased 25% of the Barton Syndicate
from a Mr. Rosenberger of California for the sum of $1,000.00
(Exh. 50-P) .

KENNEDY thereafter gave to BARTON one-half of the

interest purchased from Rosenberger or 12-l/2%.

The net effect

was that BARTON sold 10% to J. D. Kennedy and received 12-l/2%
back from the Rosenberger part of the transaction, thus ending
up with a net gain of 2-l/2% without any transfer of money whatever.
BARTON admitted that he received 12-1/2% from the Rosenberger transaction (R. 974).
The jury, contrary to the instruction in the facts and
the law, gave judgment for $12,000.00 to BARTON against KENNEDY
(R. 486 and 561), having taken the $12,500.00 on one transaction
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and offset $500.00 on the other transaction.
No.

21

(R.

Nejther Instruction

463) or ;omy of the> other instructions permitted the jur:

to do that.

Moreover,

Instruction No.

2l

improperly denied the

plaintiff the opportunity to have set forth to the jury the

possi~

finding that since BARTON vias made rr,ore than who] e by yet t i. ng J 2-l
from the Rosenberger deal,

the plaintjff KENNEDY was not obligated

to return the money obtained on the J.
transaction.

The net effect is,

~hat

D. Kennedy portion of the
KENNEDY made the good deal

and at the same time enriched BARTON by a net gain of 2-1/2% in
the Barton Syndicate.
The relief scught by appcl!nnts he>rc js either a new
trial on the

~ssue

of R'.RTON's Third Cause> of Action of the counter

claim, or, preferabl

c

:'"rection from this court- that since BF,RT'

was made more than whole by receiving 12-l/2% in exchange for his

10% in the Barton Syndicate, the judgment rendered on the Third
Cause of Action of the counterclaim should be null and void.
CONCLUSIO)J
Based on cl,e foregoing
respectfully request that tnis

f<J.~·,:-.,

co.:~rt

lill·l

and clrquments, c1ppellc.r.

JrtCJdify certain port10I1S of Lire

orders and judgments below in accordance with the specific request!
made under each point of argumen L atJovc.:.
Respe~tfully

submitted,

Ri\Y,

& NEBEKER

('"1c:NEY

By~~-:;_d(t (~. ~-~·--

D·~J by
:r the
E Institute
. ;\ 1 of1 cMuseum
n
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